Files
plm-lottery/CLAUDE.md
T
davideandClaude Opus 5 0cf35147ad Answer user-facing API failures with a machine-readable error code
The dashboard now speaks seven languages but every failure path still showed
the API's raw English text ("insufficient balance", "current password is
incorrect"), which is the most frequent and least forgiving part of the UI to
leave untranslated.

Rather than teach the API about locales, it keeps answering in one language
and hands the client something to translate: `detail` becomes
{code, message, params}, where message stays English for non-dashboard
consumers (curl, tests) and code maps onto `error.<code>` in i18n.js. An
unknown code falls back to message, so a client older or newer than the server
degrades to English instead of a blank toast.

Domain exceptions (BetError, WithdrawalError) subclass the new ApiError and
carry the code from where the failure actually happens; str(exc) is still the
English message, so existing tests keep matching on it. Interpolated values
travel in params rather than baked into the English sentence — amounts as
*_sats, from which the frontend derives a *_plm sibling, so each language can
place them wherever its grammar wants.

admin.js reads detail.message defensively: the admin endpoints still return a
bare string, but the shared auth dependencies now return the structured form.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 21:44:39 +02:00

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# CLAUDE.md
This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
## Language
The user communicates in Italian in chat — reply to them in Italian. Everything written to the repository (code, comments, commit messages, docs, this file) must be in English. Reasoning/thinking should also be done in English.
## Project status
All 10 build-order stages from `/home/davide/.claude/plans/scalable-mixing-sloth.md` are code-complete and unit-tested (76 tests green): project skeleton, DB schema + Alembic migrations, auth, HD wallet derivation, Electrum client, deposit detection, bet flow, round/draw engine, payout, withdrawal, RBF fee-bump, admin config + audit log. Beyond the original 10 stages: a Docker + Caddy deployment (see below), a full admin dashboard (`/admin`), a static test UI for the user-facing flow (`/`), a pending-inclusive balance display (see "Balance display" below), and a Server-Sent Events push channel layered on top of the original polling (see "Real-time updates" below).
Real-money verification on mainnet, done so far: registration + address derivation, deposit crediting (1-conf), a real 10 PLM bet (broadcast, confirmed, change credited back), and a full round cycle — close → draw (real block hash) → payout (70/30 split, exact sat math verified against the broadcast tx) → confirmation → round closed → next round auto-opened. Withdrawal and the RBF bump path are unit-tested but have never been exercised against a live broadcast. See "Known gaps" below before treating this as production-ready.
Before writing code, always read the "Architecture" section below in full, plus the diagrams in [flowchart/](flowchart/): [platform-overview.mmd](flowchart/platform-overview.mmd) for the whole 5-phase flow, and [round-lifecycle.mmd](flowchart/round-lifecycle.mmd) for the round/draw lifecycle in detail. Every node in these diagrams corresponds to a behavior that must be implemented exactly as described, including the labels on the edges (conditions, retries, loops). Regenerate their companion PDFs with `flowchart/render-pdf.sh <file>.mmd` after editing either one.
Human-facing guides live in [docs/](docs/) (Italian, per explicit request — an exception to this file's English-only rule below): [setup.md](docs/setup.md), [running-the-server.md](docs/running-the-server.md), [guida-utente.md](docs/guida-utente.md), [guida-admin.md](docs/guida-admin.md).
## Commands
The server itself — in development and in production alike — always runs via Docker (see "Deployment" below); there is no supported way to run `uvicorn` directly against this codebase. The venv (`.venv/`) is only for local tooling: running tests, authoring Alembic migrations, and running the one-time scripts that generate the secrets/key material that end up referenced from `.env`.
```bash
source .venv/bin/activate # venv already created at .venv/
pip install -e ".[dev]" # install/update deps
alembic revision --autogenerate -m "message" # generate a new migration after editing app/db/models.py (applied automatically by the container's startup command — see Deployment — never run `alembic upgrade head` manually)
PYTHONPATH=. python scripts/generate_master_key.py # one-time: create+encrypt the server's master xprv (requires XPRV_ENCRYPTION_KEY in .env; see Deployment for where MASTER_KEY_PATH should point)
PYTHONPATH=. python scripts/decrypt_master_key.py # ops recovery: decrypt+print the existing master xprv (asks for confirmation first)
PYTHONPATH=. python scripts/encrypt_master_key.py # ops bootstrap: bring your own externally-generated xprv instead of generating one (getpass prompt, --overwrite to replace)
python -m pytest # run all tests
python -m pytest tests/unit/test_hd.py # run one test file
python -m pytest tests/unit/test_hd.py::test_derivation_is_deterministic # run a single test
```
`.env` (gitignored) holds real secrets for local dev; `.env.example` documents the required keys and how to generate them.
## Deployment (Docker + Caddy)
The app is always run via Docker — dev and prod alike use the same `docker-compose.yml`, just with a different `SITE_ADDRESS` (see below); there's no separate dev-mode compose file or bare-`uvicorn` workflow. `docker-compose.yml` runs two containers: `app` (this codebase, built by `Dockerfile`, runs `alembic upgrade head` then `uvicorn`) and `caddy` (reverse proxy + automatic TLS). `.env` holds the app secrets; `docker-compose.yml` overrides `DATABASE_URL`/`MASTER_KEY_PATH` inside the container to point at the bind-mounted `./data/` (db, encrypted master key, logs — all gitignored, persist across container restarts). Set `MASTER_KEY_PATH` in `.env` itself to the host-side equivalent, `./data/keys/master.xprv.enc`, so the venv-run key-generation scripts above (see "Commands") write to the exact same file the container reads — one source of truth for the key, whichever way it was generated.
```bash
mkdir -p data/db data/keys data/logs # one-time: host dirs bind-mounted into the app container
# one-time: generate the master key via the venv script above (scripts/generate_master_key.py),
# not via `docker compose run` — MASTER_KEY_PATH in .env already points at ./data/keys/
docker compose up -d --build # build + start app and caddy — same command for dev and prod
docker compose logs -f app # tail app logs (also written to ./data/logs/app.log)
docker compose down # stop
```
Caddy's site address comes from `SITE_ADDRESS` (env var on the host, read by `docker-compose.yml`):
- **Dev, no domain**: leave it unset (defaults to `localhost`). Caddy detects it isn't a public hostname and issues a self-signed cert from its own internal CA — browsers will warn on first visit, expected for local testing (`curl -k` or click through).
- **Production, with a domain**: `SITE_ADDRESS=lottery.example.com docker compose up -d` (DNS must already point at the server, ports 80+443 reachable). Caddy automatically requests and renews a real Let's Encrypt certificate — no other config needed.
Known risk: `docker-compose.yml` sets `restart: unless-stopped` on `app`, so a crash mid-round auto-restarts the container — which hits the scheduler-resume gap below (a round stuck in `closing`/`drawing`/`paying_out` at restart stays stuck). Don't treat this as unattended-safe until that gap is closed.
## Tech stack (MVP)
- **Backend language**: Python.
- **PLM node access**: Electrum protocol only (no full node/P2P). Bootstrap server for development: `santantonio.sytes.net:50002` (SSL).
- **Auth**: Argon2 password hashing + JWT sessions.
- **Secrets**: master xprv encrypted at rest with a symmetric scheme (AES-GCM/Fernet); the encryption key itself lives in an env var, never in the DB or in git.
- **Operational config**: every business/round parameter (fee address, bet amount, round duration, round cooldown, draw animation duration, minimum amount, network fee rate, RBF timeout) lives in the `round_config` DB table (single row, `app/rounds/config.py`) and is only editable live via the admin dashboard (`/admin`) or its API — no env var involved at all, no redeploy or restart needed. Defaults for a brand-new instance are hardcoded column defaults on the `RoundConfig` model (`app/db/models.py`), not `app/config.py`. Secrets and infra wiring (master key, JWT secret, Electrum host, admin token, database URL) stay env-var-driven in `.env` since those genuinely need a restart.
- **Round cooldown**: `round_cooldown_seconds` — gap after a round closes before the next one opens, so players have time to see the outcome (default 30s). Not in the original flowchart; added afterwards as an explicit design decision.
- **Maintenance pause**: `RoundConfig.paused` (default `false`), toggled via `POST /admin/pause` / `POST /admin/resume` (a dedicated "Manutenzione" card in `/admin`'s Parametri section, not a plain config field — it's a deliberate operator action, audit-logged as `lottery_paused`/`lottery_resumed`). When set, `rounds/service.py:open_new_round_if_needed` stops opening a *next* round once the current one closes — it never interrupts a round already in progress (that one still closes, draws, and pays out its winner normally). `GET /rounds/current` exposes it as `lottery_paused` so the user-facing page (`/`) shows a maintenance banner.
## PLM network parameters
Source of truth: `PalladiumWallet` repo, [ChainProfiles.cs](../PalladiumWallet/src/Core/Chain/ChainProfiles.cs) and [PalladiumNetworks.cs](../PalladiumWallet/src/Core/Chain/PalladiumNetworks.cs) — always re-check that repo if a value is needed that isn't listed here, rather than guessing.
Mainnet:
- BIP44/84 coin type: `746` (i.e. HD path `m/84'/746'/0'/0/index`)
- Bech32 HRP: `plm`
- P2PKH address version byte: `55` (addresses start with `P`)
- P2SH address version byte: `5`
- WIF prefix: `0x80`
- Block time: 120s
- BIP32 extended key headers (Legacy/native-segwit `zprv`/`zpub` etc.): see `ExtKeyHeaders` in `ChainProfiles.cs`
## Balance display
`place_bet`/`request_withdrawal` (`app/bets/service.py`, `app/withdrawals/service.py`) select whole UTXOs to cover the amount (`select_utxos`, largest-first) and mark every selected UTXO `spent_txid` immediately at broadcast time — well before the tx has any confirmations. `User.cached_balance_sats` (`recompute_balance`, `app/wallet/balance.py`) only sums confirmed, unspent UTXOs, so right after a bet/withdrawal it understates the user's real balance by the entire unconfirmed change amount, which is often far larger than the amount actually moving.
`compute_pending_balance` (`app/wallet/balance.py`) fixes the *displayed* number without touching what's actually spendable: it decodes the raw tx of every in-flight (`status="pending"`) bet/withdrawal `PendingTransaction` belonging to the user and sums whichever outputs pay back to the user's own address, adding that to `cached_balance_sats`. `GET /users/me` returns both `balance_sats` (confirmed-only — still what withdrawal-max and internal spend logic use, since only confirmed UTXOs are actually spendable) and `pending_balance_sats` + `has_pending` (what the frontend displays, colored green when settled and amber while `has_pending` is true).
## Real-time updates (SSE)
`GET /rounds/stream` (`app/api/routes/rounds.py`) is a Server-Sent Events channel layered *on top of* the original polling loops in `app/static/index.html`/`admin.html` — polling is the fallback, not replaced, so a blocked/dropped SSE connection just degrades to the pre-existing behavior. The channel carries no payload and needs no auth: it's purely a "something changed, go refetch" ping; personalization (e.g. `user_played` below) still lives entirely in the normal per-user REST endpoints.
`app/rounds/events.py`'s `RoundEventBroadcaster` (module-level singleton `broadcaster`) is a simple in-process pub/sub — one `asyncio.Queue` (maxsize 1, so redundant notifications coalesce) per connected SSE client. `broadcaster.publish()` is called from every point that changes something a dashboard would want to know about: a new round opening (`rounds/service.py`), every round status transition (`rounds/scheduler.py`: closing/drawing/paying_out/closed), a bet or withdrawal broadcast (`bets/service.py`, `withdrawals/service.py`), any pending tx confirming — bet/withdrawal/payout (`tx/confirmation.py`), a deposit credited (`deposits/service.py`), and a new block tip arriving (`electrum/listener.py` — the exact moment the "drawing" phase is waiting on).
Deliberate scope decisions, not oversights:
- **Single-process only, no cross-worker fan-out.** Fine for the current deployment (one uvicorn process, see `docker-compose.yml`). A multi-worker/multi-container deployment would need a shared channel (e.g. Redis pub/sub) instead — don't add that speculatively before it's actually needed.
- **Generic broadcast, not a per-user channel.** Every connected client refetches on every event, even ones irrelevant to them. Acceptable at the expected scale (~100 concurrent users); a targeted per-user channel would need auth on the SSE endpoint and server-side knowledge of who's affected by each event — real engineering work, only worth it well past current expected concurrency.
- `MAX_SUBSCRIBERS` (default 500, `app/rounds/events.py`) is a defensive cap only — past it, `GET /rounds/stream` returns 503 instead of opening a stream, and the client's `EventSource` just falls back to polling. Not a substitute for the app-wide "no rate limiting anywhere" gap (see Known gaps).
Frontend: both `index.html` and `admin.html` open an `EventSource('/rounds/stream')` and, on an `update` message *or* on `open` (which fires on the initial connection and every automatic reconnect), immediately re-run the same refresh calls polling would eventually do — this matters most right after a dropped connection reconnects, closing most of the "missed while disconnected" gap.
## MVP business parameters
- Bet cost per round: **10 PLM** by default, admin-configurable (`RoundConfig.bet_amount_sats`) — not a fixed constant.
- Prize split: **70% winner / 30% fees**, hardcoded in `rounds/scheduler.py` (`winner_share = pool_amount_sats * 70 // 100`) — unlike bet amount, this ratio is not in `RoundConfig` and would need a code change, not an admin-panel edit.
- Minimum withdrawal amount: equal to the current bet amount (`RoundConfig.bet_amount_sats`), enforced in `app/withdrawals/service.py` — not a separate admin-configurable field. Deposits have no server-side minimum check.
- Confirmations required for all tx types (deposit, bet, payout, withdrawal): **1**, hardcoded in `tx/confirmation.py` — not configurable, per the design decision below.
## What is PLM Lottery
A periodic-round lottery system built on a Bitcoin-like coin (PLM, mainnet). Each user gets a dedicated P2WPKH address (server-side HD wallet); they deposit PLM to that address, place a fixed-cost bet to enter the current round, and when the round closes a winner is drawn who receives 70% of the prize pool (the remaining 30% goes to fees).
## Architecture (from the flowchart subgraphs)
The flow is organized into 5 phases (see [flowchart/platform-overview.mmd](flowchart/platform-overview.mmd) for the full-platform diagram, and [flowchart/round-lifecycle.mmd](flowchart/round-lifecycle.mmd) for the round/draw phase in detail):
- **REG (Registration)**: on signup the server derives a new P2WPKH address via BIP84 (`m/84'/coin'/0'/0/index`, one index per user) from a master xprv **encrypted at rest**. This address is permanent and serves as both the deposit address and the address that receives winnings and withdrawals.
- **DEP (Balance top-up)**: an ElectrumClient/SPV subscribes to the user's address scripthash. Internal balance (DB) is credited after **1 confirmation only** — the reorg risk at 1-conf is knowingly accepted in v1, with no rollback logic.
- **PLAY (Bet)**: fixed cost per round, **at most one active bet per user at a time** in v1. The server builds a PSBT user-address → pool-address for the fixed amount, with a **change output back to the same user address** (the user's balance must never exactly equal the bet amount). Fee minimized (~1 sat/vB), **deducted from the bet amount**. If the tx doesn't confirm within a timeout, fee-bump (RBF) and rebroadcast.
- **DRAW (Periodic draw)**: configurable timer (default 10 minutes). The round's own deadline (`opened_at + round_duration_seconds`) is the authoritative "yellow light" cutoff for new bets — **not** the DB status transition. `place_bet` (`app/bets/service.py`) calls `rounds/service.round_accepts_bets(round_, round_duration_seconds)`, which rejects the bet once the deadline has passed even if `status` is still `"open"` in the DB (the `RoundScheduler` tick that flips it to `"closing"` runs every `_TICK_INTERVAL_SECONDS` = 5s and can lag a few seconds behind the deadline). This closes the race where a bet placed in that lag window would otherwise still be accepted. Once a round leaves `open` (closing/drawing/paying_out), **no new bets are accepted** for it either, and a new round can't open until the current one is fully `closed` (see round cooldown below). Round closing **waits for all already-broadcast bets to confirm** before proceeding (avoids losing bets at the round boundary) — this is the "yellow light" behavior: no new entries once the timer hits zero, but bets already in flight are still given time to confirm before the round actually closes and draws. The **next round only opens once the previous round's payout tx is confirmed** — rounds never overlap in v1. v1 draw algorithm (deliberately simple, meant to be replaced later): wait for the first block confirmed after round closing, use its hash as seed, `index = seed mod participant_count` over the participant list ordered by **broadcast timestamp** (this is also the tie-break when two bets confirm in the same block). Every participant has **equal probability regardless of bet amount** (consistent with the fixed bet amount). The payout (70% winner / 30% fees) is signed with the pool address key; the **payout fee is deducted from the winner's 70%**, the 30% fee share stays intact. Same timeout → RBF → rebroadcast pattern here too. The frontend shows a generic "drawing" status box (phase label, e.g. "Pagamento al vincitore in corso…") to **every** viewer on every dashboard for the whole closing/drawing/paying_out phase — this one is purely cosmetic status text, driven directly by `status`, no gating. Independently and *additively* (not instead of it), a personalized "Hai vinto!/Non hai vinto" box appears only for users where `GET /rounds/current`'s `user_played` field is true (computed via `app/auth/dependencies.py:get_optional_user`, since this endpoint is reachable logged-out too) — everyone else has nothing to reveal and never sees it. That reveal is additionally delayed by at least `draw_animation_seconds` (admin-configurable, default 20s) for cosmetic suspense, anchored to the round's server-provided `closes_at` timestamp rather than a client-side "first seen" time (so reloading the page can't reset the countdown), and decoupled from the real (and much longer, ~block-time) wait for `winner_user_id` to actually be set. Once revealed, the result is persisted in the browser's `localStorage` (`plm_persisted_result`) so it survives a page refresh even after the round moves past `paying_out` into `closed` — at which point `get_active_round` stops returning that round at all and `winner_user_id` disappears from `GET /rounds/current` entirely. `GET /users/me/last-round-result` (`app/api/routes/users.py`) is a durable, DB-backed backstop for a user who reloads on a browser/device that missed the live reveal window completely: it looks up the most recent *closed* round the user has a `RoundParticipant` row in. See `app/static/index.html`'s `refreshRound`/`checkLastRoundResult` for the full reveal logic.
- **WITHDRAW (Withdrawal)**: the only way to move funds out of the platform to an external address. PSBT user-address → external-address + change back to the user address, fee deducted from the withdrawn amount, same RBF retry pattern.
PLAY and WITHDRAW share a **per-user DB lock**: a user can never have a bet-build and a withdrawal-build in flight at the same time, since both would otherwise spend from the same UTXO set on the user's dedicated address.
**Three separate on-chain confirmations, not one, between the timer hitting zero and the payout landing** — a common point of confusion, worth spelling out explicitly:
1. **Last bet's confirmation** (`scheduler.py`'s `_tick`, the `pending_count` check before `_close_and_draw`) — the round doesn't even flip to `"closing"` until every already-broadcast bet has its 1st confirmation. This can already have happened before the timer expired; it's the earliest of the three and not necessarily tied to the deadline at all.
2. **The draw block** (`_wait_for_next_block`, waits for `tip_height > tip_at_close`, where `tip_at_close` is recorded only once step 1 is done) — by construction this must be a **later, different block** than whichever one confirmed the last bet in step 1.
3. **Payout confirmation**`_trigger_payout` broadcasts only after step 2's block is known, then registers a `PendingTransaction(kind="payout")` that the same generic `ConfirmationPoller` (`app/tx/confirmation.py`) waits on independently — this needs **yet another, later block** than step 2's, since the payout can't be built before the winner is known.
So worst case (last bet confirms right at the deadline) is ~3 block times end-to-end; best case (all bets already confirmed before the timer hit zero) is ~2 (draw block + payout block). At PLM's 120s block time that's roughly 46 minutes worst case, 24 minutes best case — independent of `draw_animation_seconds`, which only sets a cosmetic minimum for the frontend animation.
## Internationalization (user-facing page only)
`app/static/i18n.js` holds every user-facing string of `/` in 7 languages (en, it, es, fr, de, ru, zh) as one flat `TRANSLATIONS` table — no build step, no fetch, loaded before `app.js` so `t()` is available everywhere. Language comes from `localStorage.plm_lang`, falling back to `navigator.language`, falling back to `en`; the switcher lives in the **chain-bar, not the navbar**, deliberately — the navbar is hidden until login, which would leave the landing page and the login form untranslatable for exactly the users who need the switch.
- Static markup is translated by attribute (`data-i18n`, plus `-html`, `-placeholder`, `-title`, `-aria-label`, `-alt`), applied by `applyStaticTranslations(root?)` on `DOMContentLoaded` and on every switch. Anything rendered from server data is built with `t()` in `app.js` instead, and re-rendered by `onLanguageChange()` — an element must be in one camp or the other, never both, or the two mechanisms overwrite each other (this is why `#bet-btn` has no `data-i18n`: its label carries the admin-configurable bet amount, so `renderBetButton()` owns it).
- **Every language must have exactly the same key set.** There is no fallback beyond `en`, and a missing key renders as the raw key string.
- `/admin` is intentionally **not** translated (operator-facing, Italian only), and neither is `/guida` (serves `docs/guida-utente.md`).
**API error contract** (`app/api/errors.py`): the API is single-language by design. User-facing failures answer with a structured `detail``{"code", "message", "params"}` — where `message` is English for non-dashboard consumers and `code` is what the frontend maps onto `error.<code>` in `i18n.js` (falling back to `message` for an unknown code). Domain exceptions (`BetError`, `WithdrawalError`) subclass `ApiError` and carry the code from where the failure actually happens; `str(exc)` is still the English message. When adding a user-facing error: give it a code, add `error.<code>` to all 7 languages, and pass interpolated values through `params` (amounts as `*_sats` — the frontend derives a `*_plm` sibling automatically) rather than baking them into the English text.
## Admin dashboard and test UI
Two static single-page apps, served directly by FastAPI (`app/main.py` mounts `app/static/` and adds a dedicated `GET /admin` route) — no build step, no framework. Each page's HTML/CSS/JS are separate files (`index.html`/`style.css`/`app.js`, `admin.html`/`admin.css`/`admin.js`), served as plain static files (no bundler):
- **`/` (`app/static/index.html`)**: the end-user test UI. Register/login, then a menu-driven dashboard (Deposito with a QR code of the address via `GET /qr/{address}`, Bet, Prelievo) with a persistent round-status card (`GET /rounds/current`: id/status/timer/participant count/jackpot) above the menu.
- **`/admin` (`app/static/admin.html`)**: gated by a token screen (not a real login — just checks `X-Admin-Token` against `ADMIN_TOKEN` from `.env`), then a navbar-driven dashboard with five sections, each backed by its own `/admin/*` endpoint (`app/api/routes/admin.py`): Parametri (`RoundConfig` CRUD), Utenti (list + per-user WIF privkey export, audit-logged), Round (history), Transazioni pendenti (in-flight RBF candidates), Audit log. **`/admin` is deliberately not linked from `/`** in either direction — reachable only by knowing the URL.
Both pages talk to the same JSON API everything else uses; there's no separate "admin API" vs "user API" boundary beyond the `require_admin` dependency.
## Non-obvious domain decisions
These choices were made explicitly during design (not derivable from reading a single file) and must be respected in any implementation:
- Private keys (xprv) are generated and held **server-side** — this is not a non-custodial system: the user never controls their own keys until they make an explicit withdrawal.
- The user's personal deposit address always doubles as the winnings-receiving address: there is no separate "winner address".
- 1 confirmation is the chosen threshold for all tx types (deposits, bets, payouts, withdrawals): don't introduce different thresholds (e.g. 3 or 6 confirmations) without an explicit decision.
- The draw algorithm (node R) is deliberately simple and should be treated as a replaceable/pluggable component, not the final design — don't architect around its current implementation.
- The admin panel can export any user's raw WIF private key (`GET /admin/users/{id}/privkey`, `app/wallet/hd.py:derive_user_wif`). This is intentional, not a vulnerability to fix: the server already holds the master key everything derives from (custodial by design, see above), so this only exposes through the API something an operator could already do via a script. Every access is written to `audit_log` (`admin_privkey_accessed`) — don't remove that logging when touching this endpoint.
- RBF fee bumps are paid by whoever's change output the tx pays back to — the user for bets/withdrawals, the pool for payouts — never by the fixed counterparty amount (recipient/winner/fee-address outputs are untouched; only the sender's own change shrinks). See `bump_fee` in `app/tx/broadcast.py`.
## Known gaps / TODO
Not blockers for reading the code, but must be addressed before this is production-ready:
- **Scheduler doesn't resume mid-flight rounds after a restart.** `rounds/scheduler.py`'s `_tick()` only acts on rounds with `status == "open"`. If the process restarts while a round is `closing`/`drawing`/`paying_out`, it's permanently stuck — nothing re-enters `_wait_for_next_block` or retries `_trigger_payout`. Needs a startup routine that inspects in-progress rounds and resumes (or a periodic "unstick" check) before this can run unattended.
- **RBF bump only handles one case**: a single change output, paying back to the tx's own sender address, large enough to absorb the fee increase. No additional-input selection fallback — an exact-amount tx (no change) or a change output too small to absorb the bump raises `RbfError` and needs manual operator intervention. Documented in `tx/broadcast.py`.
- **Payout retry**: if `_trigger_payout` fails (e.g. insufficient pool UTXOs, Electrum disconnected), it just logs and returns — the round stays stuck in `paying_out` with no automatic retry.
- **Withdrawal and RBF bump have never been exercised against a live broadcast** — only deposit and bet flow are verified end-to-end with real PLM as of this commit.
- **No general user-facing history endpoints** (list my own bets / withdrawals / past rounds) — `GET /users/me/last-round-result` covers exactly one case (the outcome of the most recent *closed* round the user played in, as a reveal-persistence backstop; see DRAW above), not a real history. The admin side has more (`/admin/rounds`, `/admin/pending-transactions`, `/admin/audit-log`), but there's still no "my own full history" equivalent for a logged-in user.
- **Admin auth is a single shared bearer token** (`ADMIN_TOKEN`, `X-Admin-Token` header) — no per-admin identity or audit trail of *who* changed config (the `audit_log` table records *what* changed, not which operator did it). This token now gates a lot more than config (user list, private key export, round/audit history), so its blast radius if leaked is correspondingly larger.
- **No rate limiting / abuse protection** on any endpoint (register, bet, withdrawal, admin).
- No automated integration tests against a live Electrum connection — all live-network verification so far has been manual (ad hoc scripts + real mainnet transactions), not part of the `pytest` suite.
- **`docker-compose.yml`'s `restart: unless-stopped`** on the app container means a crash mid-round auto-restarts straight into the scheduler-resume gap above — see the Deployment section.