Corroborate deposit credits, not just external spends (B-59)

A candidate external spend has needed a quorum since B-29, but `value` and
`height` for a *credit* came from the single active connection and went straight
into utxo_events. One hostile or broken server could therefore inflate a user's
displayed balance with outpoints that don't exist. It never spends anyone else's
coins — a bet or withdrawal built on a phantom UTXO is refused at broadcast and
rolled back — but it wedges the balance display and burns build attempts, and on
a custodial platform a balance that isn't real is a support incident either way.
Balances move in both directions; both directions now need the same quorum.

corroborate_utxo_credit asks the other configured servers whether they report
the same outpoint, for the same amount, confirmed. The height itself isn't
compared: a server still catching up reports height 0 and simply doesn't agree,
which is the same answer, while two honest servers can't disagree on the height
of a genuinely confirmed outpoint.

refresh_user gains the phase that shape already implied: find_new_credit_
candidates (new, confirmed, not already held) inside the first session,
corroboration outside any session, then credit_confirmed_utxos over what
survived. Only new outpoints are corroborated — re-checking what we already hold
would open a connection to every other server on every refresh for an answer
that can no longer change anything.

A failed corroboration delays a credit, it never loses one: the next scripthash
notification or DepositReconciler sweep (300s) re-offers the same outpoint, and
the withholding is logged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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davideandClaude Opus 5 committed 2026-08-03 22:40:15 +02:00
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@@ -40,21 +40,6 @@ remains the last prerequisite for running unattended.
## High — security
### B-59 — deposit crediting is not corroborated, unlike external-spend detection
`app/deposits/service.py:31-45`, `app/electrum/listener.py:401-433`.
A candidate external spend is corroborated across the other configured servers
before it can reduce a balance (B-29), but `value` and `height` for a *credit*
are taken from the single active connection with no cross-check. A hostile or
broken server can inflate a user's displayed balance with outpoints that do not
exist. The blast radius is bounded — a bet or withdrawal built on a phantom UTXO
is refused at broadcast and the rollback releases it — but it wedges the user's
balance display and burns build attempts.
Fix: either corroborate credits the same way (symmetry with B-29), or record the
asymmetry explicitly as an accepted risk in CLAUDE.md with its bound stated.
### B-60 — `POST /admin/bug-reports/{id}/status` writes no audit entry
`app/api/routes/admin.py:404-419`.